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Introduction
In a modern western society many choices are made by different households at different times. What to buy,  
how much to spend and how much to save, what will be the return over the various types of savings, how 
much to borrow and will a household’s future income be sufficient to repay such debt? Will there be jobs  
available to earn an income?
A lone sailor shipwrecked on a small tropical island knows what to do. It is the struggle for survival and  
these struggles relies on his taking the initiative and apply his inventiveness. Western societies are more  
complex  with  different  households  taking  decisions  which  affect  the  debt,  equity  or  income  of  other 
households.  For  instance the decisions  taken by a  government  on taxes  and on creating and increasing  
government debt affect the financial position of the business sector and of the individual households. So do 
the decisions made by a central bank in setting interest rates, buying up government bonds and restricting,  
maintaining or even subsidizing liquidity levels for the banking sector. The banking sector plays a major role 
in setting the levels of debt available both to the company sector and to individual households. Jointly the  
banks can lend to individual households amounts which simultaneously encourage home building but also 
produce price rises in homes. If the lending volumes exceed the growth in personal incomes by a substantial  
margin, many borrowers will be unable to pay back such loans and the reverse process of lower house prices, 
higher savings and reduced economic activity will set in. Individually each household has no power to stop 
such a process. Individual households options are also limited if there no jobs available to them. In case there 
are jobs, they still have the choice to spend or to save, but these choices are strongly influenced by the 
choices made by the government, the central bank, banks and the business sectors.
With  unemployment  rates  at  record  highs in  Europe  and not  far  off  record  highs  in  the  U.S.  and still  
substantial in the U.K., the limits to the freedom of choice for individual households is clear for all to see.  
Individuals do not choose to be unemployed; individuals do not voluntarily wish to give up their homes;  
individuals do not wish to lose their life savings in their pension pot due to poor economic management. 
Individuals also do not wish to have to pay higher taxes due to governments’ inabilities to balance their  
income and expenditures. Money and especially debt accumulation constitutes the most serious threat to the  
freedom of choice for individual households, whether it is their own debt or debt imposed upon them by their  
government. One needs an income to pay back personal, but also government debts: an economic truth that  
seems mostly forgotten.
The focus of this paper is on individual households and its economic interdependence with the other types of  
households. The focus is on income levels, on net worth levels and on debt levels over a sufficiently long  
period to draw some helpful conclusions on what, why and how it happened and when did such events occur.
If the interaction between different types of households does not work properly, which could be defined by  
the number of people who want to work but cannot find jobs, than one has to consider whether this is due to 
lack of incomes, lack of savings, excess of debt, or lack of growth in the net worth position of individual  
households. Economic growth depends on it, but rather more importantly individual financial self reliance  
depends on it.
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1. Debt
1.1 The level and purpose of debt
The reasons for individual households to borrow money is usually to buy a home or a durable consumer  
good, like a car for instance, or to purchase items on a credit card for which payments will have to be made  
in future. In, for instance, the United States the total household liabilities as per the end of 2012 stood at  
$13.453 trillion and 90.8% of these liabilities were used for the three purposes mentioned above.  Mortgages  
alone constituted 70.1% of the total liabilities1.
Individual household debt nearly always needs to be paid back out of an individual’s income. The assets  
acquired -homes and cars for instance- are not acquired for business purposes, but only for personal use. It is  
important to stress this point, not because it is not well known, but because it sets individual household debt  
apart  from debt incurred by the business sector.  In the latter sector debt  finances the capital  goods and 
working capital for a firm which enables a company to earn a cash flow out of which the debt can be repaid.
For individual households the debt taken up in a given year extends the scope of consumption. Without such 
borrowings the acquisition of homes and consumer goods could most likely not have taken place, especially 
not for the most expensive personal acquisition: a home. What debt also means is that future income flows 
are reduced by the repayments of the debt. Future income levels are encumbered.
The only other remaining type of household which incurs debt is a government. On 2 May 2013 total U.S.  
government debt outstanding was $16.8 trillion. With an estimated number of households of 127 million this 
implies a government debt level per household of $132,300 at the moment. Based on the same number of  
households the individual household’s average outstanding private debt came to $105,900 as per the end of  
2012. Compare this to the average home sales price in the U.S. as per February 2013 which was $152,000 2 
and one may realise the true extent of U.S. government debt. One should also compare such debt levels to  
the median households’ income in the U.S. which stood at $45,018 in 20123.
The purpose of incurring additional government debt is to maintain spending levels over and above tax 
income levels. The rationale for doing so, especially the extent of doing so, is under fierce debate at the 
moment. Some say that under current economic circumstances a reduction in government spending levels 
will cause further hardship on economies which already are under heavy strain. Others maintain that in order 
for an economy to start growing, governments must reduce their demand for debt, so that the private sector 
has more resources to grow. A second type of debate is going on -usually between different political parties-  
over  the  percentage  of  government  expenditure  out  of  the  GDP  level  which  should  be  consumed  by 
government. The conservative parties -including the U.S Republicans- usually fight for a smaller government 
role and other parties for more government activities. There is also a great difference between countries,  
especially between the U.S. and European countries. The latter have a substantially higher percentage of  
government expenditure to GDP than the U.S. The latest available data over 2011 for U.S Federal and State 
and Local government spending as compared to GDP points at about 38%4. For the U.K. this percentage in 
the same year stood at 49%, while it was 49.4% on average for the 17 Eurozone countries with the highest  
two countries: France at 55.9% and Denmark at 57.9%5
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In the  U.S.  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank publishes  quarterly and annual  data  on the debt  positions  of  all  
individual households as part of its overall assessment of the net worth position of these households. The 
latest data are the annual data over 2012.In the U.K. the Office of National Statistics publishes debt data of 
individual households on an annual basis, the latest full year data which are available are for 2011 6. For the 
Eurozone the European Central Bank has just published a study: The Eurosystem Household Finance and 
Consumption Survey (HFCS). (ECB Statistics Paper Series No.2 / April 2013)7, which collected data from 
the 15 Eurozone countries over  2010.  Such a study allows a comparison between countries  at  a  single  
moment in time, but cannot reveal the more important question of how individual household debt levels have 
moved over time.
In table 1 a summary is  provided for the increase or decrease in individual  households’ debt levels per 
annum (P) and a government debt level increase or decrease per annum (G) over the same period. P + G data  
have been compared to the nominal GDP amount from same year. These statistics have been put together for 
the period 1996-2012 for the U.K. and U.S.
Table  1  U.K  and  U.S.  Changes  in  Individual  households’  and  Government’  borrowing  levels  as 














1996 21.8 32.1 53.9 6.98% 363 251 614 7.83%
1997 37.2  25.9 63.1 7,60% 362 188 550 6.60%
1998 38.2   4.9 43.1 4.90% 636 114 750 8.53%
1999 51.3 -1.3 50.0 5.38% 442 130 572 6.12%
2000 60.8  -6.2 54,8 5,61% 597 18 615 6.18%
2001 74.2 -33.0 41,2 4,03% 623 133 756 7.10%
2002 107.3   3.1 110.4 10.27% 783 421 1204 11.31%
2003 126.6 31.6 158.2 13.89% 1064 555 1619 14.53%
2004 133.4 35.7 169.1 14.06% 1468 596 2064 17.41%
2005 73.1 41.2 114.3 9.11% 1151 553 1704 13.50%
2006 157.3 39.0 196.3 14.78% 1207 574 1781 13.31%
2007 107.7 37.0 144.7 10.29% 851 501 1352 9.64%
2008 29.5 25.0  54.5  3.80% -151 1071 920 6.03%
2009 -17.4 91.9  74.5  5.34% -222 1885 1663 11.93%
2010 8.0 142.6 150.6 10.33% -179 1652 1473 10.14%
2011 0.6 145.8 146.4 9.70% -210 1229 1019 6.75%
2012 133.7 32 1276 1308 8.24%
1.3 What happened to the debt volumes over the period 1996-2012?
6 Nationalbalancesheetfinaltables_tcm77-276505[1].xls
7 http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/ecbsp2en.pdf
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One may conclude on basis of these data that individual household debt levels accelerated and decelerated 
over  time.  The  borrowing boom seems  to  have  been  followed  by a  reduction  in  outstanding  levels  of  
individual household debt.
Home mortgages - as the main borrowing category for households- can have two effects: a volume aspect of  
building more homes and extending or improving existing homes. It can also have a price effect whereby the 
money is used to fund a price increase in homes. When companies increase prices and demand levels stay 
equal, the cash flow position of companies will improve and they will usually make more profits. In the case  
of individual households, a house price increase does wonders to the equity net worth, but nothing for the  
owner-occupier’s income level. A general house price increase means that the money received from a sale  
will only allow the acquisition of a similar sized property at the increased price as well. The price has gone 
up, but the benefits of living in one’s own or an identical place have not changed. If individual households 
see no income benefit, one has to doubt the macro-economic value of such price rises. It certainly makes it 
more difficult  for younger people to get a foot on the property ladder. The volume effect of new home 
building  and extending or  improving  homes  has  a  direct  effect  on  economic  activity.  This  latter  effect 
supports economic growth.
In the U.S. over the period 2000-2004 individual households’ liabilities more than doubled but even more 
strikingly is that home mortgages as a percentage of total household liabilities increased as well. In 2000  
they represented 58.7% of all individual households’ liabilities, in 2001 66.7%, in 2002 68.8%, in 2003  
70.32% and in 2004 71.44%. The growth in home mortgages  was even faster  than the growth in total  
household liabilities.
In table 2 the average annual house price increases or decreases are provided for the U.S. as collected by the 
Federal Housing Financing Agency8 as well as the percentage volume changes in new housing starts.
Table 2: Average annual house price changes in % in U.S. (qtr3 over qtr3) over the years 2000-2012
and volume changes in new housing starts9
Year














-4.28 2.79 6.78 8.10 9.58 4.11 -14.7 -23.9 -35.3 -35.6 3.70 3.22 32.9
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One should make a distinction between the need for new housing starts and the supply and demand for 
homes. In the U.S., as in other countries, the need for new housing starts is finite as it depends on the number  
of  individual  households.  The  current  need  is  determined  by  population  growth,  changes  in  household 
composition and replacement of homes which have reached the end of their useful life span. In the U.S. the 
need for new housing starts hover around 1.6 million homes a year.
In the three year period 1999-2001 this need was fulfilled at an average increase in mortgage debt level of  
$422 billion per annum. The need for homes and the supply and demand for homes coincided. With an  
average sales price of new homes in 2001 of $213,20010 for 1.636 million new housing starts, this equates 
quite closely to the increase in mortgage borrowing levels of 2001. However in 2001 the U.S. benchmark 
interest rate was lowered during the year from 6% to 1.75% per annum.
The effects of this lowering of interest rates set of a home mortgage borrowing boom. In 2002 6.78% more  
homes were started than in 2001. If they had been build at the same sales price as in 2001, this would have  
required  an  increase  in  outstanding  mortgage  volume  of  $450 billion.  The  actual  increase  in  mortgage 
borrowing levels  in  2002 was $705 billion.  Volume  increases  and house price  developments  started to 
deviate. For 2003 this was even more pronounced. With a volume increase of 8.1%, the mortgage amount  
needed for this would be about $490 billion, however the actual mortgage amount increased by $882 billion. 
This  trend continued to  and including 2006 when both in  2005 and 2006 home  mortgages  levels  were 
increased by $1 trillion in each of the latter two years, far above what would have been needed if house  
prices had not accelerated so much.
How irresponsible this borrowing binge was both from lenders’ and from a borrowers’ perspective can be 
seen if one compares the nominal median income development of individual households over the period  
2000 to 200611.  The latter  income increased from $41,186 in 2000 till  $47,262 in 2006,  an increase of  
14.75%, while the mortgage debt increased by 105.1% from $4.814 trillion in 2000 till $9.874 trillion in 
2006. 
One characteristic of home mortgage debt is that, once taken up, the level of debt can only be reduced out of  
a household’s income, if the owner is at the same time the occupier. The only other alternative is a write-off 
by the lenders. When house prices started dropping -as they did from 2008-2011- the debt level did not move  
down. It continued at the same level irrespective of the value of the house. Table 1 showed that the reaction 
of individual households over this period was to pay back existing home loans and fund new home starts 
-albeit at a lower level- totally from incomes or savings. From the Balance Sheet of Households one can  
deduct that $1.14 trillion was repaid by the end of 2012 compared to the outstanding level as per the end of  
2007 or about 10.8%. In the meantime over 3.5 million homes were built for which financing was arranged 
out of incomes or out of savings.
For those who could afford to pay back their home loans, nearly all did, but there was a category of debtors  
who could not raise the cash to pay back their home loans. In the period 2008-2012 4.5 million homes were 
repossessed12 and had to be sold back to the market.
The conclusion out of the above is that there is a finite need for new homes based on population growth,  
changes in households’ compositions and the “replacement” factor of derelict homes. With a finite need a  
balance was found in the period 1999-2001 between volume and price movements, whereby $422 billion in 
mortgage lending was sufficient to build 1.636 million new homes in 2001. In the subsequent years the  
amounts needed to finance the “asset inflation”, became bigger and bigger, so much so that over the period 
2000-2006 average household incomes increased by 14.75%, while the outstanding mortgage debt increased 
by 105.1%. The debt to income ratio did beat all standards of prudent banking. Regretfully no one in the U.S. 
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balance between individual income growth and the debt incurred by the individual households: both personal 
long tem debt and the added burden of government debt.
1.5 The equity effect
Individual households have an equity level, just as companies have. It is the net worth level as described in  
the balance sheet of households as collected by the Fed in the U.S. and the Office of National Statistics in the 
U.K. It is the assessment of the assets held, the liabilities incurred and the net worth -the equity base-. If such  
an assessment could have been made on a daily basis, it would also have shown the income earned, how 
much was used for spending on the same day, how much had to be paid back on outstanding debts and how 
much was added to the savings.
When  in  2007  and  2008,  a  large  number  of  households  in  the  U.S.  became  incapable  of  maintaining 
payments on their outstanding mortgage loans, it had an effect not only on banks in the U.S. U.S. banks had 
transferred the risks on a substantial share of such mortgages to others via securitisation. Secondly American  
banks and insurance companies  had underwritten credit  risks on such mortgages,  through credit  default  
swaps. The losses incurred were no longer restricted to the U.S. alone, but spread over banks, insurance 
companies and pension funds in many countries.
To understand the full impact of a loss on an outstanding loan, one has to consider the funding side of such 
loan, which is the savings amount which was provided by other individual households. The non-payment on 
a loan means that the equivalent value of the savings is written off and that no future interest payments will  
be made: a loss on principal amount as well as on future cash flows. A bank or a pension fund may hold the 
funds on behalf of an individual household, but the loss is a loss to other individual households, other than 
the borrower involved. The loss also affects the borrowing household itself. Some down payments will have 
been made, which are lost.  In the U.S. such loss affected 4.5 million borrowers who lost their homes over  
the period 2008-2012. Such repossession and subsequent sales depresses house prices and new home starts  
as can be seen from table 2.  What this does is that the effect  of  the loss is  no longer contained to the 
individual borrower and lender, but is spread over all home owners and savers. An individual loss turns into 
a loss to all  home owners,  even for those who do not  have a mortgage.  Secondly economic activity is 
depressed  as  the  repossession  and  sale  of  “second  hand  homes”  competes  with  new home  starts.  The  
evidence as provided in table 2 is that such economic activity remained depressed for a number of years and  
only recently there has been an upturn. What, of course, also happens is that banks need to replenish their  
equity.  Such equity capital  is owned by the individual  households.  The losses force banks to -probably  
temporarily- rein in their lending not only to individual households but also to companies as the outlook for 
the sales levels of these companies will also be impaired. Unemployment levels will start to rise and the 
money losses on loans cause income losses to individual households. The financial sector errors did cause  
the latest crisis and the victims are the individual households, both through their wealth -equity- factors and  
through their incomes -unemployment-.
To put it in perspective: in 2008 in the U.S. individual households made a loss of $12.6 trillion to their equity 
base. On top of this they also lost their “dividend and interest” income, which if one takes the previous 7  
years as a guidance worked out at $3.3 trillion per annum. The total loss came to $15.9 trillion. The U.S. 
GDP value was $13.955 trillion in 2008; therefore the loss represented 111.2% of GDP value. A similar  
calculation for the U.K. showed an individual household loss of 90.3% as compared to the U.K.’s GDP value 
in 2008.
A conclusion which has been rarely drawn, is that the collective losses incurred by the individual households 
far outstripped any losses which the banks made in 2008. However rescue efforts were not directed to the 
individual households, but to the banks. It is the same case in Europe where bank rescues and government 
rescues have taken priority over rescuing the individual households. In Europe for most countries the current  
unemployment situation has no historical equivalent, apart from the Great Depression period.
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When irresponsible lending practices by banks and borrowings by governments lead to equity losses and 
subsequently to income losses for individual households, the solutions need to focus on how such income 
losses can be reversed, not for the banks or for the governments, but for the individual households.
2. The income effects for individual households: the Income Gap approach
The reactions in an economy to a fall in house prices caused by excessive lending practices include banks 
reining in their credit exposure to all individual households and to private sector companies. Private sector  
companies will rein in their investment and employment levels as demand for their goods and services drops.  
The drive to return to profits by the private sector leads to a series of “losses” for the individual households.  
Such losses can be quantified under the collective concept of an income gap.
An income gap can be defined as a shortfall in purchasing power to buy all goods and services which could  
have been produced if all available manpower would have been fully utilised.
There are four variables which determine the outcome of the income gap: the number of people employed,  
the  number  of  people  unemployed,  the  changes  in  the  labour  force  participation  rates  and the  income 
increases of those employed compared to the consumer price inflation levels. Examples will be given for the  
U.K. and the U.S.
2.1 The income gap and employment and unemployment levels
In the U.K. in 2006 29.025 million people had a job and the labour force participation rate was 72.8% of all  
individuals in the age group 16-64 years. In 2006 1.674 million people were unemployed, which was 5.4% of 
the labour force.
When the labour force participation rate drops, it means that less income is generated by the active labour  
force. For instance take the case of 2009 as an example. In 2009 the actual employment level was 28.960  
million people and the labour force participation rate 70.9%. If  the rate of 72.8% had been maintained, 
776,000 more people would have had a job. At an average income of £23,410 per person, this loss in income 
amounted to £17.95 billion which was equal to 1.28% of nominal GDP in 2009. Add to this that -compared 
to 2006- 720,000 more people were registered as unemployed. This meant that unemployment benefits had 
to be paid for the unemployed, increasing government expenditure by 43% for the unemployed category. The 
additional unemployment benefits added up to £2.4 billion in 2009 or combined with the change in labour 
force participation rates a total income loss of £20.35 billion which equalled 1.46% of nominal GDP in the 
U.K. in 2009.
The income loss by those who could have worked, but could not get employment, as well as the costs of  
unemployment benefits, leads to a double loss for individual households still in work. The collective labour 
force earns less -for 2009 it was £17.95 billion less to be precise- and it has to pay more in taxes to support  
those out of work -again £2.4 billion more in 2009-. One should be reminded that there is no value judgment  
in this statement; the discussion is not about whether unemployment benefits should be paid and for which  
amount;  this  is  a political  choice.  The income loss  reflects the actual  impact  on individual  households’ 
incomes for those still in work -the economic impact-.
An element which is often overlooked is that such income loss cannot be recuperated in future years. It is a  
time related loss: the U.K. labour force did not work and has not worked at full capacity since 2009. The 
labour factor is different from the production capacity of machinery. Machinery can usually be used in future  
years until a technical collapse occurs. Since 2009 in the U.K., the labour force participation ratio has not  
reached 72.8% again and the unemployment rate has not dropped till 5.4%. In the U.K. since 2008 losses on 
incomes have been accumulating year after year, reducing the prospects for economic growth, the financial  
health of banks and companies and the health of the U.K. government’s finances.
9
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One  does  not  have  to  make  a  precise  calculation  for  countries  like  Spain,  Greece  and Portugal  where 
unemployment rates have soared, to understand how the very substantial income losses have worked their  
way into their respective economies.
Just one more country example: the United States. In December 2006 the size of the U.S. labour force stood 
at 152.732 million people of which 145.970 million were employed and 6.762 million were unemployed or  
4.4% of the labour force. These figures were seasonally adjusted. In December 2009 the labour force stood at  
153.120 million with 138.025 million employed persons and 15.095 million unemployed or 9.9% of the 
labour force. The labour force participation ratio was 66.4% in December 2006 and 64.6% in December  
2009. While some demographic factors can play a role in the reduction of the labour force participation rate 
-early retirement from work for instance- the reduced rate can also occur due to people being so disappointed  
in finding jobs that they no longer bother. The latter group are in the right age group 16-64 years, but are no 
longer actively seeking jobs. In the period December1997-December 2006 the U.S labour force participation  
rate dropped from 67.2% till 66.4%. However since 2007 the drop has been much more severe from 66.4% 
till 63.5% in February this year (2013). This is unlikely to all originate from demographic factors, especially 
in the U.S. where it is quite common to work past retirement age. The income losses due to the reduced 
labour force participation rates are substantial. For instance, if in 2009 the labour force participation rate had 
been sustained at 66.4%, some 1.8% or 2.756 million people could have earned additional incomes. The 
amount  would have been $45,155 -the average employee  income in the private sector-  times  the 2.756  
million, which equals $124.5 billion in lost income. The rise in unemployment figures from 6.762 million in 
2006 to 15.095 million in 2009 -an increase of 8.333 million led to additional unemployment benefits of  
some $126.5 billion in income losses to the working population. From these two factors alone, the U.S.  
economy suffered an income loss of 1.8% of nominal GDP in 2009.
Again, like in the U.K. and other countries, in the U.S. the income losses accumulate. However in the U.S.  
the unemployment rate has come down to 7.7% in February this year (2013). In the U.K. the latest data 
indicate a stagnating unemployment rate at 7.8%., while in the Eurozone countries the unemployment rates 
are still rising.
2.2 The income gap and inflation levels
Inflation -price rises- have a negative effect on the value of the monies earned through employment as well  
as on the value of savings. In the next table an overview is given for the U.K. for the period 2000-2012 for  
the retail price index, the average annual nominal earnings and the average annual real earnings.13 
Table 3: Retail Price Index, Average Annual Nominal Earnings, Average Annual Real Earnings U.K. 
2000-2012
Year RPI  (2010=100) Av.  Annual  Nominal 
Earnings (£s)
Av. Annual Real Earnings
(in 2010 £s)
2000  76.176 16,545 21,719
2001  77.526 17,403 22,448
2002  78.818 17,953 22,778
2003  81.098 18,525 22,843
2004  83.513 19,331 23,147
2005  85.871 20,215 23,541
2006  88.615 21,164 23,883
2007  92.414 22,217 24,041
2008  93.256 23,019 24,683
2009  95.589 22,975 24,036
2010 100.000 23,504 23,504
2011 104.860 24,087 22,970
2012 108.100 24,472 22,639
13 http://www.measuringworth.com/ukearncpi/
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In the period 2003 till 2008 the average annual earnings went up by 3.7% and inflation by on average 1.6% 
per annum, which left the average earner with an in increase in real earnings before tax. However since 2009 
inflation rates increased and the increase in nominal  earnings slowed down.  In real terms this meant  a  
decline in income levels to the extent that the 2012 average earnings in the U.K. after inflation were no  
higher than in 2002.
The disposable income levels are also influenced by government tax takes. In fiscal year 2002-2003 the U.K.  
Government’s expenditure levels were at 38.5% of GDP and in fiscal year 2011-2012 such expenditure had 
gone up to 45.4% of GDP. The fact that the U.K. Government had to borrow a substantial part of such  
expenditure does not take away the responsibility of individual households to pay back such expenditure.
The conclusion for the U.K. is that since 2009 the real incomes of individual households have been dropping 
and the tax obligations have gone up, a scissor movement which leaves individual households in a much 
weaker position to expand consumption and borrowing levels.
For the U.S. the following table shows how the production workers hourly compensation in nominal dollars  
compares with the U.S. inflation levels over the period 2002-2012.
Table 4 Production Workers Hourly Compensation and U.S. CPI levels 2002-2012
Year Production Workers
Hourly Compensation






2002 8.57 1.58 +++
2003 2.47 2.28     +
2004 7.10 2.66 +++
2005 3.68 3.39     +
2006 1.88 3.23    - -
2007 2.88 2.85    +/-
2008 3.19 3.84      -
2009 1.08 - 0.36    ++
2010 1.11 1.64      -
2011 1.67 3.16  - - -
2012 1.00 2.07    - -
This table only gives a partial picture of what happened in the U.S. Firstly it deals with those in work and not 
with  those  who  could  not  find  jobs  any longer.  The  income  shock  for  those  who  lost  their  jobs  was 
significantly more extensive than for those still in jobs or those in self employment.  Secondly from 2009 the  
U.S. Government budget deficit increased from $458 billion in 2008 to $1.413 trillion in 2009. In 2010 it 
was reduced somewhat to $1.293 trillion and stayed practically at this level in 2011 and 2012. This all means  
that U.S. individual households not only saw their real income levels drop over the last three years, but also  
simultaneously saw their debt obligations increase sharply as a consequence of the budget deficits run up by 
the U.S. Government. Again the scissor movement occurred as was the case in the U.K.: higher debt levels  
combined with real income drops.
3. The equity gap
An equity gap for individual households arises when savings are not used to the benefit of savers to produce 
an income: interest and dividends.
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In this connection it is important to clarify what are productive assets and which assets do not produce an  
income  -the  non-productive  assets-.  As  explained  above  mortgage  debt  only  adds  to  an  income  in  an 
economy if it was used to fund the building costs of new homes or the renovation or extension costs. If  
existing homes go up in price, such price movement does not create an income for the owner-occupier as his  
need is to have shelter for his household, either in his current home or another home of similar size and price.  
What  makes  things worse is  the  situation whereby individual  households  increase their  home mortgage 
borrowings  based  on  higher  home  prices,  rather  than  on  basis  of  higher  incomes.  This  may  lead  to  a 
temporary push in demand, but with the added risks of higher default levels in later periods. Higher default 
levels lead to more volatility in house prices, which is especially harmful when house prices start dropping. 
The other main type  of debt  -government  debt-  represents assets,  which generally speaking also do not  
produce  an  income,  neither  for  the  government  itself  nor  for  any  individual  household.  On  the  whole 
government debt should be classified as being of the non-productive asset  class.  This is  not  to say that  
education,  defence,  police,  justice, health care and social  security transfers have no value,  but  only that  
borrowing for maintaining spending levels for these activities does not produce an income in future. If it did,  
why not borrow 100% of government expenditure?
In summary: productive assets are assets which create an income in current and/or future years. All lending 
and other funding sources to companies are included in the productive financial asset class. For individual 
households only the part of a mortgage debt is included, which helps other households to gain an income.  
House price rises do not fall into this category and therefore funding such actions from financial sources  
other than one’s own, creates non-productive assets. Government spending adds to creating an income for 
other households, but if such funding is not based on transfers from individual households in the same period  
through taxation, the debt created does not add to income in future years as it is based on charging one  
section of the individual households to pay another. Such financial assets are by nature non-productive. The  
interest income created equals the interest expense of other households.
The real challenge in an economy is to maintain a balance between the growth in productive assets and the 
non-productive assets.  Both are financial asset  classes, but the non-productive assets do not  generate an 
income for individual households.
3.1 Interest rates and productive and non-productive assets
A key question has to be raised about the appropriate interest rate levels for different financial asset classes. 
Should there be one level suits all or should there be different levels?
Take the case of home mortgages in the U.S. Over the period 2000-2006 incomes increased with 14.75% and 
the mortgage debt increased by 105.1%. How drastic an increase in interest rates would have been needed to 
stop mortgage debt accumulating at a much slower pace? A second question would be, if such interest rates  
were raised to a sufficient degree to stop the home price inflation level from rising substantially above the  
consumer price index, what would happen to business sector borrowings? Would the business sector not be  
punished for actions which had nothing to do with them: the changing level of individual households’ debt?  
Another question is why is it that the level of government debt is increasing quite rapidly, like in the U.S and 
the U.K. and the interest rate these governments pay for their own debts has been dropping substantially? 
 Concentrating on U.S home mortgages again, in 2001 the base rate was lowered from 6% to 1.75%. Of 
course this had an effect on home buyers’ behaviour. However taking out a mortgage loan has two aspects:  
the repayment of principal and the applied interest rate. For most individual households it will take some 
thirty years to repay an outstanding mortgage. It is a very long term commitment. A short term interest rate 
reduction has some effect,  but  if it  is  not guaranteed for thirty years,  home owners and the lenders are 
exposed to interest rate risks, which may lead to all sorts of defaults. What individual households need is a  
predictable long term cash outflow to pay for their mortgage. Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac were set up to 
achieve such long term funding at a fixed rate. What the U.S. economy also needs is a balanced growth  
between income developments and home mortgage funding. Can this be achieved by a one interest rate fits  
all approach? In my view non-productive asset growth has to be treated differently from productive asset 
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growth. In the case of home mortgages over the period 2000-2006, credit volume levers should have been 
built into the system, either through temporary increases in bank reserve requirements or through outright  
penalties for the lenders for creating excessive market growth levels in home mortgages. Both would have 
had a temporary cost effect on the supply of mortgages which would have slowed down the pace of lending. 
The latter measure would have penalised the most aggressive lenders more than the conservative ones.
For government debt the interest rate picture is already one of many interest rates applied. How quickly can  
U.S. individual households repay the over $16 trillion government debt? Such debt has a potential repayment  
period of well over 70 years, as otherwise the whole U.S. economy would come to a halt if any shorter 
period would be chosen. The U.S. government, in line with many other governments, uses a mixture of debt  
maturities and a mixture of interest rates. There is not a single applicable interest rate for such debt and none 
of the interest rates applied do reflect the fact that the ultimate maturity of the debt is probably 70 or more  
years. All this is possible due to the liquidity level in the U.S government bond market, whereby one lender  
replaces another on a continuing basis. With the U.S. individual household net worth level of $66 trillion as  
per the end of 2012, this can still be seen as a very safe bet. The “equity” level of the individual households  
can well absorb such government debt. However -just as in the case of home mortgages- one has also to 
consider  the  changes  in  the  individual  households’  incomes.  If  government  debt  increases  faster  than  
individual household’ income levels, it will mean that each marginal dollar in tax receipts includes a larger  
percentage -larger than the household’s income growth percentage- for interest payments. This can be called 
the interest effect. Such effect reduces the effectiveness of government expenditure on economic growth. 
The moment the U.S., or any other government for that matter, also starts to reduce their absolute debt level  
the impact on economic growth will be quite substantial. 
In my opinion the logical  manner  to  deal  with debt  of  different  groups of obligors -a  government,  the  
business  sector  and  the  individual  households-  is  to  create  separate  interest  rates  or  other  appropriate 
measures for each group. For the business sector the aim is to ensure that for this sector there is medium term  
fixed rate financing available at a level slightly above the consumer price inflation level. If needed a central  
bank could drive down the costs of lending to the business sector by refinancing such business loans made  
by the banking sector at a specified interest rate: the medium term business interest rate. 
For managing the home mortgage levels the central bank could have the powers to rein in such lending when 
the  growth  in  home  debt  substantially  exceeds  the  income  developments  in  a  society.  A bank  reserve 
requirement arrangement probably combined with a penalty system would work most effectively. Also the 
arrangements made available through Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac -both very successful in ensuring that  
home mortgages are of a fixed rate nature for thirty years- could be more aligned with income developments. 
Finally a government, in setting its own borrowing interest rate, needs to keep in mind the different needs of  
its constituents: the business sector and the individual households. The practice of quantitative easing used 
by both the Fed and the Bank of England has been based on the assumption that buying up one type of 
outstanding debt -gilts or government bonds- will lower the yield on corporate bonds and shares and will  
lower borrowing costs to individual households. Pension funds and insurance companies are supposed to 
replace the government debt acquired by a central bank with other investments. The lower yield on the latter  
assets would make it cheaper for businesses and households to borrow, so that they can absorb more debt and 
start the economy to grow again.
The whole justification of quantitative easing has been based on the price -the yield- of debt instruments and 
on the money available to acquire such debt titles.  It  has not been based on individual households’ and 
business sector’ incomes and debt levels, not on existing savings levels directly and indirectly available to 
individual households and also not on existing demand levels in the housing market or in the business sectors  
in general. It also bypasses the question of how much of these monies will stay in a particular country, as  
capital markets are the most internationalised of all markets.  What the above analysis has shown is that  
individual  households  suffer  from an income  gap and an equity gap.  The income gap has  caused U.S. 
households to repay more than 10% of outstanding home mortgage debt since 2008. The equity gap has 
shown that compensation for savers below inflation levels causes repayment of debt rather than incurring  
more debt. In the period 2008 till to-day the costs of existing outstanding debt to households outweigh the 
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benefits of taking on new loans. One should note that individual households on both sides of the Atlantic 
have experienced below inflation level wage and salary increases over the last few years and are therefore  
already hard pressed on the income side. The effects of an equity gap can be illustrated by the fact that  
individual households in the U.S. have reduced their total liabilities levels from $14.11 trillion by the end of  
2008 till $13.45 trillion by the end of 2012 and percentage wise they have reduced the long term mortgage 
debt by even more. The Fed’s acquisition of debt titles to the extent of over $2 trillion has not had any  
incremental effect on household liabilities.
The effect of QE has also been zero on company values. By the end of 2007 the value of corporate equities  
stood at  a  nominal  $9.63 trillion and by the end of  2012 the value was $9.77 trillion,  notwithstanding 
inflation levels above zero for most of this period. Again if borrowing costs for companies did come down, 
which they did, it certainly did not have any effect on the valuation of U.S. companies. What is more, U.S.  
conglomerates are reportedly sitting on large piles of cash and are not very much inclined to invest as long as 
consumer demand is not picking up. In the meantime U.S. government debt is increasing with about $1.2 
trillion a year.
The situation in the U.K. is even more pronounced. The Bank of England has purchased £375 billion of  
mostly  government  debt  (gilts)  out  of  a  total  U.K.  government  debt  level  of  slightly  over  £1  trillion.  
Households’  liabilities  in  the  period  2007-2011 -the latest  available  data-  did not  show any significant  
change. They were up in nominal terms by £20.7 billion over this period on a total amount per end 2007 of  
£1.52 trillion notwithstanding significantly higher inflation levels in the U.K. than in the U.S. Total share  
values were completely identical per end of 2007 as per the end of 2011 at £604 billion.
One has to express serious doubts about the effectiveness of QE. The thesis that replacing one type of debt  
for another has had any beneficial effect on company values or on individual households’ borrowing levels  
cannot be justified with the statistics which are provided. Rather the contrary. What QE has done, as the  
Bank of England has acknowledged, is that it has increased the inflation level by 1%. What QE has also done  
is to widen the equity gap for individual households, by reducing the interest payments to these households 
in three ways. The first one applies to the volume of interest payments. When one takes out £375 billion out 
of the gilts market, it means that for these £375 billion, the individual households no longer receive the  
interest payments, an income loss. Secondly the return over any additional government borrowing has also 
been brought down, a second type  of income loss.  Thirdly the price of the alternative investments  was 
supposed to go up. However such price effect never happened. These are three negative effects of QE. In the 
U.K. many more households are on interest only or on standard variable mortgage rates for their  home  
mortgages, as compared to the U.S. Of course QE has brought down the longer term borrowing rates, not just  
for the U.K.s’ government but also for the rest of the households. The real dangers lie in the reverse process  
when interest rates start to rise.
What  is  important  to  state  is  that  in  the  period  since  2008,  individual  households  already experienced 
tremendous losses on their net worth and on their future income flows from the lost asset values. The QE  
policies extended such losses even further. This does not make sense in a period when households’ incomes 
and their equity base are already under severe pressure.
There are solutions to these dilemmas as will be set out in the next section.
4 Possible remedies.
The macro-economic objectives for countries could be formulated as follows:
• Avoid a rise in house prices  far in excess of growth of individual households’ incomes;
• Set  up  a  system of  30  year  fixed  rate  mortgages  for  individual  households,  in  line  with  their  
mortgage period payback obligations;
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• Correct the income gap by using a small part of existing households’ savings to add to consumption 
levels
• Correct the equity gap by issuing index-linked government bonds
• Create a business sector medium term fixed interest rate mechanism
• Turn banks into true risk taking enterprises by paying systematically to all fund providers
• Last but not least, maintain a balance of between the growth of productive assets and non-productive 
assets.
4.1 Avoid rise in house prices far in excess of growths of individual households’ incomes 
The key element to manage developments in house prices is not to control house prices directly but to focus  
on the debt created to fuel the house prices to rise. If like in the U.S. average incomes increase by 14.75% 
over the period 2000-2006 and mortgage debt increases by 105.1%, one does not need to be a banker to see  
that debt-to-income ratios have far exceeded any reasonable levels. If like in the U.K. the household debt  
increased over the same period by about 100% according to a Bank of England report 14 and average nominal 
incomes by 27.9% (see table 3), than again one may see that the debt-to-income ratio has exceeded any 
reasonable level. This process coincided with the value of the housing stock in the U.K. increasing by some  
88% over the same six years.
The question “why” to avoid an excessive rise in house prices can actually be answered quite simply.  In  
doing so one avoids the losses made to the equity base of individual households due to the inability of a 
number of individual households to keep up mortgage payments out of incomes. The latter factor creates 
“losses” to other individual households, both in equity and in future cash flows. Such losses affect banks 
-owned by individual households- and they affect house prices negatively. The drop in house prices does not  
only affect the borrowers but all home owners. New housing starts will be reduced as the repossessed homes  
are returned to the supply of homes. Economic activity will be slowed down as companies try to restore their  
profitability levels -the income gap phenomenon-. Government deficits will increase.
As stated above, if a volume of lending to individual households exceeds their ability to repay the debt and 
simultaneously forces up house prices, than a solution cannot be found in adjusting the applicable interest  
rates upwards. The latter action would affect the cost base of the business sector. Volume control can be  
achieved by managing the supply side of funds for mortgage lending. There are at least two ways to achieve  
such goal. The first one is by changing the reserve requirements for banks holding a mortgage portfolio. The 
second one is to impose fines to the sellers -the mortgage originators, the banks and the investment banks 
selling such mortgages to third parties. Of course such system could start with a traffic light system. Green 
stands for continue your home mortgage lending activities, amber stands for slow down and red stands for  
excessive speed and remedial actions.
Managing specific lending levels, like the lending volume for home acquisitions, involves all institutions 
(banks etc.) collectively,  which carry out such lending levels.  It  represents a system risk, rather than an  
individual bank risk, notwithstanding that some institutions might have been more aggressive than others. In 
carrying out above managerial activities,  the system risks for individual households and for the banking  
system will be reduced. There will be fewer losses to overcome.
4.2 Set up a system of fixed rate 30 year mortgages for individual households
14 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb070105.pdf
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The mortgage loan period over which nearly all individual households can afford to pay back their mortgage 
is some 30 years.  Therefore there is the need to create funding mechanisms which take such repayment  
period into account. A second consideration is to expose individual households to the least possible interest  
rate risks, so that they can plan their cash outflow out of their income base for a long period to come. Banks 
do not  have 30 year  fixed rate funding at  their  disposal;  some might  take the maturity mismatch  risks.  
However from a prudent banking perspective such mismatch risks can put the whole bank at risk of default. 
Quite a few banks have learned the hard way that such actions can be very risky. What banks have done is to  
offer standard variable interest rates based on the central banks base rate. What happened in the United 
States in the run up to 2007 is that banks rolled up part of the interest payments due for the first two years, so 
that a low attractive interest rate could be offered, followed by a steep hike in interest rates. In the U.K. a 
substantial number of mortgages are interest only mortgages, which do not foresee in a repayment plan, other  
than by selling the property.
All these lending methods expose individual households, but also the whole economy to interest rate risks  
(followed by house price risks and full blown recession risks) which are unnecessary and can be avoided.
Any country has the option to set up a National Mortgage Bank, like Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac in the U.S.  
Such an NMB can be set up as a semi-state owned organisation, which means that all individual households 
are the joint owners and collectively liable for the NMBs’ obligations. Funding can be attracted in the same  
manner as Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac attract their funds. One difference to the latter two organisations can  
be that such NMB does not take the client credit risk; this should be the activity of the mortgage providers,  
usually the banks; they would charge a margin over the funding provided by the NMB.
In 2008, both Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac had to be rescued by the U.S. Government. The reason was that 
both organisations took the funding plus the credit risks on selected clients and a steep drop in house prices 
was not foreseen in the scenarios. By having banks judging the income risks and the NMB the funding risks,  
one gets the best of both worlds. Banks can always participate in the various funding activities of a National  
Mortgage Bank. What is equally important is that a long term funding institution, like an NMB, can help  
avoid the boom-bust scenarios in home mortgage lending which occurred in the period 2000-2008.
4.3 Correct the income gap by converting a small  part of individual households’ own savings into 
consumption
A structural change has taken place both in the U.S. and in the U.K. This change has been the accumulation  
of financial resources in pension reserves. Pension reserves are assets owned by individual households and 
invested in financial assets. In line with the objective to build up a pension pot sufficient to cover the income 
needs over the retirement period, the build up sum of financial assets is only very gradually released back to  
incomes. This all means is that individual households have substantial financial savings, but are unable to  
access any of such savings, even at times when an income gap occurs.
How important these savings are can be illustrated by the most recent figures in the U.S. At the end of the  
fourth quarter 2012 pension reserves stood at $14.06 trillion, while all liabilities by individual households, 
excluding government debt, stood at $13.45 trillion per same date. Individual households in the U.S. have  
been saving very substantially over the period 2008-2012. As per the end of 2008 these figures were: pension 
reserves: $10.51 trillion and collective household liabilities $14.11 trillion. 
For the U.K. the figures are equally striking. At the end of 2011 the insurance technical reserves stood at  
£2.21  trillion,  of  which  pension  reserves  at  over  £2  trillion,  and  total  household  liabilities  -excluding  
government debt- at £1.54 trillion. Per end 2008 the comparable figures were insurance technical reserves: 
£1.90 trillion and financial liabilities: £1.55 trillion.
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The assets of nearly all pension funds are practically completely invested in marketable financial assets.  
Pension funds allocate their financial resources over a portfolio of shares, bonds, mortgage backed securities  
or other securities. Such investments represent the liabilities of banks, companies, government entities and, 
to a very limited extent, individual households. Such investments help economic growth, but only in periods 
that individual households do not experience the income gap phenomenon. Collectively pension funds are 
pro cyclical institutions, in good times they raise the pay-out to pensioners, in bad times they reduce the pay-
out. Under defined benefit schemes companies have to cough up additional financial resources in bad times 
in order to close the pension deficit; not a particularly intelligent use of company resources. In conclusion  
individual savings in pension funds are not used to help close the income gap; in effect they help to widen 
the gap when such a gap occurs. 
The phenomenon of the income gap was caused by companies adjusting their output levels to the lower 
demand levels after the 2008 economic crash.  Companies tried to improve their efficiency levels as a result  
of lower prospects for profits. However, from a macro-economic perspective, such actions are self defeating. 
Companies reduce their intake of employees and thereby reduce the monies available to maintain demand 
levels. Companies reduce their financial risks by borrowing and investing less in plant and machinery. The  
result is that companies benefit from becoming leaner and meaner, but that individual households suffer from 
reduced opportunities to earn an income. Also governments will receive less tax revenues and generally see 
their deficits increase. An increasing number of individual mortgage borrowers will become unable to keep 
up their mortgage payments, more companies will go bankrupt, and government debt keeps on increasing. 
The  growth  in  productive financial  assets  is  reduced and the  growth  in  non-productive financial  assets  
accelerates, including the losses encountered on financial assets. This is, macro-economically speaking, a  
very inefficient manner to adjust an economy.
The question should be raised can the financial muscle of pension funds be used to adjust an economy in a 
more efficient manner? Why are pension funds assets so important? Firstly it is the scale of such savings 
levels. Both in the U.K. and in the U.S., but also in countries like The Netherlands and Australia such saving  
levels exceed the total volume of individual household liabilities, excluding government debt. They are now 
at a level where they are close or even above annual GDP levels.
Secondly pension funds assets are supposed to help secure a future income level for individual households.  
However does the future not start to-day? 
With their  giant  collective size,  often a number  of times annual  government  revenue levels,  one has to 
wonder why not more thought has been given to the role that such savings institutions can collectively play 
to redress the income gap. There are some recent indications that discussions are going on. In a bulletin  
issued  on  the  14th May 2013 The  Dutch  Central  Bank (DNB)  has  suggested  that  due  the  reduced tax 
incentives given to pension savings in the Netherlands from 2015 onwards and the extended savings period 
for younger people, an amount of Euro 9 billion will not be needed from the pension reserves built up by  
Dutch pension funds. The Dutch Central Bank suggests in its bulletin15 to use these funds for stimulating 
economic growth by returning such funds to the pension savers now in order increase consumption. This is a 
suggested specific solution for a pension surplus which arises out of a change in regulations.
In more general terms I suggested in several  previous papers to use “economic easing” as a method to  
overcome the income gap. Why would it be to the benefit of pension savers and pension funds to participate  
in such a scheme? The purpose of pension savings is to provide an income in future years. The future is  
however closely linked to the current performance of the financial assets, especially if there is no backing  
from companies to overcome any shortfall in pension reserves. Defined contribution schemes do not have  
such backing, but defined benefit schemes are also at a disadvantage to companies when the latter have to 
pledge substantial financial resources at times of low or no economic growth. Money which could be used  
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In 2008 pension funds in the U.S lost practically $3 trillion of their savings values and this was after the 
pension contributions of 2008. This was a 22.4% value loss over the previous year. If, in 2009, the pension 
funds  would  collectively have  decided  that  the  income  gap situation  was  avoidable  if  their  savers  and 
pensioners got a pension dividend - a return of a small percentage of the total pension savings, say $150 
billion or 1.5% of total savings- than a series of effects would have taken place. Such pension dividend  
would have increased the median household income of $ 49,777 with $1350 or 2.7% for the 113.6 million  
households. If all was used for consumption purposes than the economy would have gotten a boost of 1.08% 
in consumer spending. No individual household would be worse off as only their own savings were used, so 
no additional borrowings. Companies would not have panicked as much as they did in 2009 and would have 
kept more employees  on the payroll  and still  made more profits.  The U.S.  government would not  have  
experienced such a drop in tax income and the deficit would have been significantly smaller. There would 
have been no need for quantitative easing, which in the U.S. alone absorbed more than 13 times the amount  
which would make “economic easing” effective. The savers would at least have had a positive return over 
inflation levels. The real economy in which incomes are earned would have been the winner.
What about the pension reserve pots, the sources of future pay-outs? Would the pension funds be the losers? 
Pension funds benefit from higher levels of economic growth, as do individual households, companies and 
the government. However if a system was devised that guaranteed that pension funds would be compensated  
if their portfolio value growth was less than the 10 year government bond yield over a period of three years,  
than it would have been more likely that pension funds would have participated in the national interest. Such 
risk is similar to the U.S. government increasing its debt level. All individual households will ultimately 
have to pay.  As it turned out the pension contributions plus the value increases did already increase the 
values of pension funds by 34.3% over the period 2008 till the end of December 2012 an increase of $3.6 
trillion.
If the pay outs would have been restricted to all participants in funded pension schemes (savers and retirees),  
than the income increase for those households within a funded pension scheme would have been higher, as  
those who are not in such schemes would not receive a cent. This would be a strong incentive to join a  
pension scheme as such “economic easing” exercise might be repeated if the income gap continued to exist.
The benefits to overcome the income gap as soon as it appears should be clear. A much reduced loss in jobs;  
higher combined incomes for all households; more production output and  higher company efficiency ratios;  
lower government deficits and a lower rate of growth in the government debt level; also less bank losses.
Even now a boost in income to help consumption levels would speed up the recovery period. The quicker an  
economy is back using all its resources, especially its labour force, the better it is for all types of households.
4.4 Correct the equity gap by issuing more index-linked bonds
In the  above a distinction was made  between productive financial  assets  and non-productive ones.  The 
difference  was  that  the  first  category  created  an  income  in  the  current  and  future  years  for  individual 
households and the latter did not. In the case of government debt, the payment of interest over such debt is 
left to individual households paying the adequate amounts as part of their tax bills. The holders of such debt,  
often the same individual households owning such debt through their pension pots, receive such tax back in  
the form of an interest payment.  This is a transfer payment  system that does not make the collective of  
individual  households  any better  off.  No income is  created that  does not  represent  an expense of other 
individual households. Does it make any difference if interest is paid at a fixed rate or as an index linked  
rate, especially in the event that the long term fixed rate no longer protects against the debasing value of  
inflation? The answer is yes, it does make a difference for those households postponing consumption levels  
in order to build up a pension pot for future incomes. In this connection it is interesting to study the pension 
fund report of the Bank of England16. From the total pension pot of slightly over £3 billion at the reporting 
date of 29th February 2012, 94.7% had been invested in index linked financial assets, of which 86% were 
16 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Documents/humanresources/pensionreport.pdf
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index linked gilts and 14% were corporate index linked assets. The Bank of England’s pension fund trustees 
clearly believe that future incomes are best secured by protecting the assets against the vagaries of inflation 
levels. Why do other pension funds not follow -at least partly- the Bank of England’s trustee actions? The 
answer lies in the breakdown of the outstanding gilts portfolio. According to the U.K. Debt Management  
Office17 the most recently reported breakdown of index-linked gilts issued and conventional (mostly fixed 
rate) gilts was 24% for index-linked gilts and 76% for conventional ones. In actual amounts around £240 
billion is outstanding in index-linked gilts. The total pension reserves of U.K. pension funds are currently 
estimated to be over £2 trillion, which makes it quite impossible to come even close to maintaining a relevant 
share of the pension assets in index-linked gilts.
The proposal would be to issue say 80% of all U.K. and other government debt in index-linked bonds for the 
benefit of the pension funds and for the governments themselves. Index-linked issues allow longer maturity 
periods, which is more in line with the character of government debt. For most countries with a government  
debt approaching or over 100% of GDP, the potential repayment period of such government stretches out 
over well over 70 years, if not longer. In the U.K. long dated index-linked gilts pay 1 ¼ % over inflation  
levels.
The same Bank of England, but not its pension fund, bought up conventional gilts when it undertook its QE 
activities to the extent of £375 billion.
4.5 Establish a medium term fixed interest rate instrument for the business sector
Businesses use individual households’ monies to create output with the objective to earn a profit. Sometimes  
it is the form of equities and more often than not it is also in the form of debt. For business planning it is  
important to know the current interest rate, but more importantly whether debt funds are available and at  
which  fixed  costs.  When  economies  need  a  boost,  central  banks  in  co-operation  with  the  respective 
governments, have several options. They can apply a “Funding for Lending Scheme”, as the U.K. Treasury 
has set  up with the help of the Bank of England.  In the U.K. this scheme is  not  restricted to business  
households  only,  including  Small  and  Medium Sized  enterprises.  Promotional  measures  for  individual  
households are best separated from those for businesses. In the U.K. banks and other financial institutions are 
and will be incentivised to extend their lending activities to the company sector. What is equally important is 
not just availability, but also the terms of the loans. Here governments and central banks can help companies  
to obtain medium term fixed rate loans, whereby banks can swap their variable interest rate book into a fixed  
rate one offered through interest rate swaps from the central bank or government.
4.6 Turn banks into “true” risk taking companies
Banks  are  different  from any other  company  in  that  their  assets  and  liabilities  are  monies  only.  Their  
activities are all related to money products, such as lending, trading currencies, trading in interest rates and  
providing other money services. 
The art of risk taking implies that banks are able to predict a future outcome for their loans, for their currency 
and interest rate positions and for their stock and bond markets listings, mergers and acquisitions actions and  
corporate or government advisory activities and finally for their trading for own account.
Two  elements  set  banks  apart  from ordinary  companies.  Firstly  banks  are  the  originators  of  debt  for  
businesses and individual households. The decision to lend is solely a decision taken by the banks. In lending  
to businesses, banks try to protect themselves from other banks adding more debt to the same business. In  
lending to individual households the market is a free for all. Secondly banks assume from the outset that they 
have  made  the  right  decisions,  in  other  words  there  will  be  no  loan  losses  or  losses  to  other  market  
participants from their M&A and stock market listings, for instance.
17 http://www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=Gilts/Portfolio_Statistics
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Banks and the regulators use the Value at Risk (VaR) approach, which is supposed to predict the outcome of 
the decisions by the bankers with some degree of certainty. Volatility, worst case scenarios, maximum loss 
assessments are based on time periods, confidence level and potential loss amounts. To give some scant  
confidence to the markets, one of the VaR assessment methods, which is used, is called the Monte Carlo 
simulation, hence the term casino banking.
“True” risk taking is based on foresight, rather than on adjustable versions which can be changed on a daily  
basis  depending on  how economic  and political  factors  change.  In  hindsight  it  has  been  clear  that  the 
collective of banks in a number of countries created a lending boom to individual households which was far  
in excess of the average income growth of these households. VaR assessments are made by individual banks, 
not by the collective of banks jointly. However the current economic problems were caused by the collective 
of banks, including the investment banks.
A way to solve this dilemma between individual and collective actions is to force individual banks to set 
their “foresight” in stone. This can be done by allowing banks to deduct from their profit levels an amount of 
“loss provision” for every loan or other activity at the moment the loan or other agreement is signed. In  
effect the VaR is assessed at the moment of taking the risk and cannot be changed later. No excuses for  
wrong assessments. 
If such VaR assessments are made tax deductible also from the day the loan or other agreement is entered  
into and cannot be changed over the lifetime of the loan or contract, the skills of individual banks and their  
bankers in predicting future outcomes will be reflected in the profit levels made. If banks made mistakes by  
underestimating VaR requirements, than such mistakes would no longer be tax deductable; they would have  
to be funded from the accumulated level of deferred staff bonuses and from a write down in the value of  
shareholders equity. If banks had been too conservative, a freefall of the excess VaR amounts would not be  
taxed and could be paid to shareholders and to the bankers who took the decisions in the past.
This leads to the concept of “shareholders” in a bank. Banks are income and expense based institutions,  
whereby incomes and expenses have all to come from financial assets and liabilities. Such liabilities include  
the  “risk”  taking  category  of  shareholders.  Banks  are  cash-flow  based  institutions  and  the  individual  
households -or their representatives in the form of pension funds and mutual funds- should get priority over 
bankers’ pay. Their value at risk is the amount of money provided to a bank in order to take the risks banks  
take. The best way to achieve such priority is to turn share capital into non-redeemable perpetual notes with 
pay out an annual fixed rate of return. Such notes could be stock market listed and the price of such notes  
would reflect the market perception of the skills of the bankers. Around par or slightly above indicates a  
well-managed bank. A steep discount to par reflects poor bankers’ judgments. More perpetual notes will be 
needed to overcome the unforeseen losses and the price for getting such risk capital will need to go up. All  
regulators need to do is to ensure that banks cannot expand unless their latest perpetual notes issues are 
quoted at around par. Investment banks should be forced to make the same VaR arrangements for their stock 
market introductions and mergers and acquisition activities. They make risk assessments that can affect the 
money  put  out  at  risk  by  individual  households.  They  -just  like  commercial  bankers-  should  be  held 
responsible  for their  advice to  the markets,  in that  they guarantee -in  a  declining time  scale-  that  their  
judgments are correct. If not they will need to buy back part of the issued stock for instance.
Collectively banks make judgments which affect all banks. The role of the economy managers - regulators, 
central bankers and finance ministers- is to maintain a balance between the growth of productive assets as  
compared to the growth in non-productive assets. This is the subject of the next section.
4.7 Maintain a balance of between the growths of productive as compared to non-productive assets
The key in maintaining a balance between the growths of productive as compared to non-productive assets  
lies in the debt  obligations taken on and/or imposed upon the individual  households by their  respective 
governments. Debts which create an income for other households -the productive assets- include household  
debt for the acquisition of cars and of other consumer goods. They also include mortgage debt to acquire or 
improve or extend homes, but only to the extent that such debt does not inflate house prices. All debt to  
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individual companies, either in the production or services sector -except for financial institutions- can be  
classified as productive assets as the companies’ aims are to make profits, which represents incomes for 
individual  households,  either  directly  as  employees  and/or  indirectly  as  a  shareholder.  As  stated before 
government debt can be classified as non-productive assets for the holders of such debt as those who pay  
-individual households- transfer identical amounts to those who receive government debt payments.
In the above the experiences in the U.S. and the U.K. were quoted. These experiences showed that excessive  
credit growth -excessive to the extent that such growth level far exceeded the income growth of individual  
households- was to blame for the current economic woes. Regretfully the result was that many households 
could no longer afford the mortgage payments, leading to a mortgage backed securities collapse and banks in  
deep trouble. This led to individual households repaying their borrowings, house and share prices dropping 
and companies reducing their capacities, including laying off sizeable numbers of staff. Governments saw 
their deficits increase rapidly.
In terms of productive and non-productive assets, the excess lending created a substantial increase in non-
productive assets: financing the rise in house price rises rather than funding new housing starts. As these  
price rises were funded by borrowings, higher and higher amounts were needed to get on or move further on  
to the property ladder with income growth lagging further and further behind. The households’ gearing ratio  
went  up and up till  breaking point  and substantial  losses  on savings were made.  Such losses  in  banks  
combined with sharp drops in share and in home price levels caused the economy to retract. The financial  
losses encouraged the economy to move further away from a balanced growth path of productive assets over 
non-productive ones. Companies retracted and governments increased their borrowings substantially.
This economic situation can be overcome, if one accepts the need for boosting productive assets. The most 
effective manner is by using a small part of the pension savings as a temporary boost to demand levels. This 
does not lead to more indebtedness for individual households as these savings are already their own savings. 
It needs collective action from the pension fund industry as it cannot be achieved by one or two pension  
funds alone.
Both the U.S. and the U.K. are in the fortunate position that they have huge pension savings. Other countries 
like Spain do not have such resources. They need help from the richer neighbours in the Eurozone. The 
adjustment path that is currently followed, focussing on governments and banks, does nothing to redress the 
balance between productive and non-productive assets.  In the current situation non-productive assets are  
increasing and productive assets are retracting. Individual households need incomes and jobs. For countries 
like Spain they need an income boost for individual households from abroad. The amounts are much smaller  
than bank or government rescues, but will be much more effective. Productive assets will be expanded and 
non-productive assets will grow less rapidly. Employment levels will be boosted and the economy will be on 
the mend. For Spain with a 2012 GDP level of just over Euro 1 trillion, the amount needed in year one is  
around Euro 25 billion,  a much smaller amount than the money provided for  rescuing Spanish banks. Such 
transfers from the richer countries will also increase demand for imports by Spain, setting off a positive  
chain reaction in Europe.
Putting productive assets and non-productive assets as well as incomes for individual households at the heart 
of economic analysis will lead to the right kind of adjustment strategies. Individual households have limited 
economic options, but collective choices can turn economies around.
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